Where Rawls's The Law of Peoples addresses war and the use of force then his position has often been identified closely with Walzer's restatement of Just War Theory, as both positions appear to take nation states, and the conflicts between them, to be the bedrock of the international system.
Introduction
Consideration of contemporary just war theory often takes Michael Walzer to be its touchstone.
This has been the case since the publication of Just and Unjust Wars in 1977 (Walzer 2006) . Such is his centrality to contemporary accounts of just war theory that when Rawls discusses the international use of force in The Law of Peoples he says, 'I follow here Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars…. This is an impressive work, and what I say does not, I think, depart from it in any significant respect' (Rawls 1999: 95n.8) . Commentators often agree with Rawls's self-assessment with Maffettone, for example, suggesting that 'Rawls' discussion of war is not particularly original and it relies substantially on Michael Walzer's theory' (Maffettone 2010 Williams characterizes just war theory like Walzer's as Hegelian because it takes the nation state as the bedrock of the international system and shares Hegel's scepticism about the possibility and functioning of a peaceful federation of free states (2012: 169) . In doing so it accepts that war is a normal and ongoing part of international relations as an unavoidable instrument of foreign policy (Williams, Howard 2012: 143 & 165) . Finally, it regards individual states themselves as solely positioned to judge just cause: when war is necessary in defence against aggression, in anticipation of aggression yet to happen and, in some cases of aggressive intervention in another state. In some contemporary just war theory this has evolved into a power (or group of powers) making and imposing their judgements about rightful force on all other states (e.g. in the name of a 'duty to protect') (Williams, Howard 2012: 145 & 165 ).
Kant's account of war and the use of force is drawn very differently from this when he states that 'morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: there is to be no war' (MM, 6:354) . 3 Williams draws this out into several features of Kant's approach. Firstly, it depicts war as 'part of the pathology of human history' and 'not a normal human activity'; even if the occurrence of war is an unavoidable anthropological starting point for international law and politics it should not be accepted as unchangeable fact (Williams, Howard 2012: 167, 152 & 107) . Secondly, Kant therefore dismisses just war theory (and so can be interpreted as having no just war theory of his own) instead arguing that, thirdly, the highest political good is perpetual peace (Williams, Howard 2012: 167) 4 and even jus in bello restrictions on fighting 3 wars can only make any sense in connection with the project of establishing this condition of perpetual peace (Williams, Howard 2012: 152) . Fourthly, Kant argues that a prime feature of his preferred republican mode of government is that it promotes peace as a consequence of its reluctance to sanction the use of force because of the involvement (through their representatives) of their citizens in political decision-making (Williams, Howard 2012: 108) .
Finally, Kant advances wholesale reform of international politics as a federation of free republican states, transforming international law into a system of rights that upholds peace rather than maintains the possibility of war (Williams, Howard 2012: 168) .
It is not difficult to see why Rawls is often thought to be lining up with Walzer rather than Kant on questions of the international use of force. Rawls, as we have seen, self-identifies with
Walzer when discussing these issues. He also, as we shall see, clearly has a just war theory of his own that makes it clear that force has some role to play in international politics. Finally, he has been generally regarded by cosmopolitan critics to be placing too much emphasis on the state as the basis of the international system. 5 However, this paper will respond to these understandings of Rawls's account of the international use of force, arguing that we better understand Rawls's account if we read it with a Kantian position in mind rather than a Walzerian one. To be clear, this paper does not intend to advance any claim of its own about whether Kant has a just war theory of his own nor, indeed, is it intended to advance any claims to a novel Kantian interpretation of any sort. Instead, the paper is focused on reading Rawls, (Rawls 1999: 6-7 & 126) . Rawls argues that these evils follow from political injustice and that once these 'gravest forms of political injustice are eliminated by… establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear ' (1999: 7 & 126 1. Assist societies whose institutions do not enable them to efficiently combat starvation and extreme poverty (Rawls 1999: 106) 2. Respond with force in self-defense (or the defense of others) when subject to aggressive attack (unjust war) (Rawls 1999: 91) 3. Potentially forcefully intervene in outlaw states to prevent mass murder and genocide (Rawls 1999: 93-4n.6 domestically are the condition of a peaceful and ordered world (more on this later).
Of course, in the fraught world of international politics and foreign policy it will not always be clear, in any particular case, what action will be the best course to adopt to further approach this ideal. It is not simply a matter of reading off prescriptions for action from the ideal picture and applying them to the non-ideal world. We might expect trial and error in actual decisionmaking to result in a lot of error and many trials. We would also expect that people motivated by envy, pride, desire, power and status will often act instrumentally in their pursuit (even if they usually cloak this in very different language). However, both Rawls and Kant think we should, at all times, bear in mind the future possibility of perpetual peace or of a peaceful Society of Peoples under a Law of Peoples that shapes their interactions: effectively a vision of a law-governed international order, as a regulative ideal in our political decision-making and foreign policy actions (Rawls 1999: 22-3. MM, 6:354-5 Kant, achieving such a peaceful world is dependent on the existence of peoples whose internal politics is appropriately organized. Finally, the reform of international politics involved in bringing about the transition to a peaceful world requires the creation of a Confederation of Peoples under a Law of Peoples that governs their interactions in an ordered and lawful manner.
Rawls and the International Use of Force
The next step in this paper is to take this outline understanding of Rawls's approach and consider if it is useful in helping us to understand the positions that Rawls expressly adopts when discussing the use of and limits on force in The Law of Peoples, and also very briefly to ask if it enables us to consider plausible extensions to those aspects of the use of and limits on force that are not expressly addressed by Rawls. Sometimes this is straightforward and quick, other times this involves a little more work. It is argued that, at almost every point, we can 9 understand the positions that Rawls does, or could, adopt as reflecting the injunction to always keep an eye on this regulative ideal of the future possibility of peace and the idea of a lawful regulated international order as achievable in principle. We can also note the clear contrasts with a position like Walzer's.
Understanding the well-ordered peoples' right to self-defense
In The Law of Peoples Rawls is explicit that well-ordered peoples, both liberal and decent but non-liberal, living as we are in a non-ideal world have a right to defend themselves against aggressive attack. Liberal peoples have this right on the basis of a need to protect and preserve the basic rights and freedoms of their citizens and to protect their democratic political institutions (Rawls 1999: 91) . Decent but non-liberal peoples also have this right to self-defense on the basis that they 'also have something worth defending', a society that respects and honours the human rights of its members coupled with decent political arrangements motivated by a common good sense of justice (Rawls 1999: 92) . The right to self-defense in both cases recognizes that unjust aggressive attack for gain, punishment or glory is an attack on the idea of a peaceful world regulated in an ordered and lawful manner. It is also an attack on the examples of well-ordered lawful regimes already existing in the world. For these reasons such attack can rightly be resisted.
Understanding the lack of right to self-defense for some states
Rawls denies outlaw states (those states that are either aggressive externally, severely repressive internally, or both) a right to self-defense, and by implication it is also denied to burdened societies (those states that are institutionally unable to deliver adequately on human rights for their members) (Rawls 1999: 91-2) . Rawls mostly discusses outlaws and two situations in which, if subject to force, they may not rightly respond with force of their own.
Firstly, they might be subject to a war of self-defense by one or more well-ordered societies responding to that outlaw state's own aggressive attack on them. Secondly, there are circumstances in which they might be subject to intervention by well-ordered societies on the basis of their egregious and severe violations of human rights that persist in the face of actions short of forceful intervention, such as sanctions (Rawls 1999:93-4n.6 ). In neither case does Rawls regard the outlaw state as having a right to defend itself (although, of course, it probably will defend itself in reality). The outlaw regime has either attacked well-ordered members of a Society of Peoples so illegitimately putting citizens of their own society and others in a situation of war, or as aggressors against their own people they are illegitimately and systematically violating their rights. The first is a direct attack not only on a well-ordered state(s) but also on the idea of a lawfully regulated Society of Peoples and so on the possibility of peace. The second is an attack on the human rights at the basis of that peaceful ideal, as well as possibly killing a lot of people.
Understanding other instances of the defensive use of force
This last point also explains why Rawls does regard benevolent absolutist societies as having a right to self-defense as they too have something worth defending (1999: 92). They may not be well-ordered with decent political institutions but they do, in practice, both respect the human rights of their own subjects and act peacefully towards their neighbours. So, despite not being well-ordered, and so they could not be members of the Society of Peoples under a Law of Peoples, they do not threaten either whatever progress we have made towards a such a peaceful Society nor the possibility of such a Society developing in the future.
By extension this might also help us to think about uses of force that Rawls does not explicitly cover, such as when one outlaw state attacks another. Now although neither state is part of the Society of Peoples well-ordered peoples will still need to consider how to respond to violence that occurs, and not just because of the danger of instability spreading to well-ordered 11 territories. The foreign policy of well-ordered peoples could, guided by the hope and possibility of a lawful international order in which human rights are respected everywhere and the evils of unjust war and mass murder overcome, regard an outlaw state attacked by another outlaw as rightfully defending its citizens against aggressive war, even if it was ordinarily no defender of their rights. Well-ordered peoples might take this position because aggressive war is never aimed at peaceful order and, unlike in the case of humanitarian intervention, the target of force is not restricted to the regime's leaders (and military if necessary) and in bello restrictions on targeting civilians are less likely to be observed by an outlaw invader. The same conclusion might be drawn if a burdened society comes under attack from an outlaw.
Understanding that the right to self-defense has its basis in the Law of Peoples
To well-ordered societies considering their foreign policy with an eye on the ideal of a lawfully (Rawls 1999: 26) . Again, even in the non-ideal world we inhabit, force is only justifiable if captured under ordered regulation, sanctioned by the Law of Peoples and thus is consistent with holding the ideal of a lawfully regulated international politics at the front of our minds.
Understanding In bello rules in the Law of Peoples
Finally in this section, the law of peoples' restrictions on conduct in war are explicitly designed with the idea of a future peace in mind (Rawls 1999: 94) and so contain traditional restrictions on waging war concerning respecting the rights of enemy combatants, limits on the place of cost-benefit analysis and on the deliberate targeting of civilians, for example (Rawls 1999: 94-7 Walzer argues that a supreme emergency exemption must satisfy two criteria. One, the immanence of danger; the threat to the community must be close and pressing. Two, the nature 13 of the danger 'must be of an unusual and horrible kind', threatening the existence of the political community itself (Walzer 2006: 252-3) . Both these criteria must be met, placing political leaders in a position where 'they will do what they must to save their own people' and they may 'override the rights of innocent people for the sake of their own political community' (Walzer 2006: 254) . Recognising that the exemption legitimates 'great immoralities' he argues that it does so 'only in the face of a far greater immorality...attack on the very existence of a particular community' (Walzer 2004: 50 From the right to self-defense of well-ordered societies and benevolent absolutisms, to the lack of self-defensive rights for outlaw states (in most instances), to the basis of these defensive rights in law rather than a state's existence, through to the strictness of limits on the emergency use of force, we gain a clearer understanding if we interpret them through the recognition that the possibility of a peaceful and law-governed international order is working as the core regulative ideal throughout The Law of Peoples.
Rawls's potential Kantian responses to further questions about the law of peoples
The final substantive section of this paper takes a little time to address two more puzzling issues Benevolent absolutist societies occupy a strange position in The Law of Peoples. They have a right to defend themselves despite being not well-ordered, though they are non-aggressive.
Although they happen not to infringe the basic human rights of their subjects they lack the desire or the political institutions to give those subjects a meaningful role in political decision making (Rawls 1999: 4 (Williams, Howard 2012: 57) . He is clear that the congress of states is to be 'a voluntary coalition' rather than an association where a state is subjected 'to someone else's concept of right ' MM, 8:356) . Instead of being propagated by force Kant argues that an existing example of lawful and peaceful relations can act as a pull on others, 'a focal point for a federal association among other nations that will join it' freely (TTP, 8:356) . In this manner Kant has faith in 'an enduring, ever expanding federation that prevents war' (TTP, 8:357) by respecting the equal status of members (TTP, 8:356) who freely agree to resolve their disputes by 'in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit, rather than…by war' (MM, 6:351) .
With this in mind we can think about the strict limitation of Rawls's forceful interventions to only some, and not even all, outlaw states and certainly not to benevolent absolutisms. Again, why not intervene in any society that is not well-ordered in order to make them so? Firstly, we need to get clear that even when Rawls does permit military intervention, force is not being used for this end (forcing the transition to well-orderedness). Instead military intervention is only permitted when absolutely necessary to stop systematic, egregious and persistent violations of human rights. The only example of justified forceful intervention that Rawls provides is in a regime that keeps its lower classes as slaves and uses them in a system of human sacrifice. In this case 'intervention in the defense of human rights would be acceptable and would be called for ' (1999: 93-4n.6) . Note, in all other cases unlike this quite extreme example, that is benevolent absolutisms, burdened societies, 'moderate' outlaws and 'extreme' outlaws who respond to means short of force, Rawls argues that peaceful and non-military influence is the appropriate response. The foreign policy of well-ordered societies should be built on peaceful persuasion, offering incentives to cooperate, offering assistance to burdened societies and, in difficult cases, the imposition of sanctions regimes.
So, force is not sanctioned in order to bring about commitment to the Law of Peoples but only to stop terrible human rights violations (or in self-defense). Of course, once we find ourselves in the position of having forcefully intervened as a last resort into an unpersuaded 'extreme' outlaw in defense of human rights then we may very well be under a duty to aid in the establishment, as far as possible, of some form of decent well-ordered regime. Having intervened we will be faced with legitimate post bellum obligations. This much might follow from a recognition that 'the present enemy must be seen as a future associate in a shared and just peace' (Rawls 1999: 101) . Regime change, however, cannot be the justifying reason for intervention.
For Rawls, like Kant, commitment 'To the extent that constitutional democratic peoples have features a) through e), their conduct supports the idea of a democratic peace' (Rawls 1999: 51 what, other than stipulation, Rawls might take to underpin the extension of the peace thesis to decent but non-liberal societies. Here I have in mind the features of the republican mode of government that is at the heart of Perpetual Peace. One of Kant's main reasons for thinking of republics as peaceful is that, in some form, 'the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war' (TTP, 8:351) . Citizens, through their representatives, will vote against calls for war on spurious or instrumental grounds as they will bear the mortal and financial costs of waging war. Forms of government that are not republican 20 are despotic and under such a 'nonrepublican constitution… the easiest thing in the world is to declare war' (TTP, . A key to perpetual peace for Kant is, then, the involvement, through their representatives, of citizens in political decision making.
Let's return to Rawls's extension of the peace thesis from liberal democracies (who we will assume meet this Kantian condition that citizens be politically involved) to decent non-liberal, non-democratic societies but not, for example, to benevolent absolutisms. It is significant that 'In political decisions a decent consultation hierarchy allows an opportunity for different voices to be heard'. 'Persons 'have the right at some point in the procedure of consultation… to express political dissent, and the government has an obligation to take a group's dissent seriously… It is necessary and important that different voices be heard ' (1999: 72) .
What is distinctive about both democratic and hierarchical consultative societies is that in both cases a key feature of the regime is that they build in mechanisms to feed citizens views (through representatives) into political decision-making including, we assume, about war. This feature is lacking in benevolent absolutisms, and also in burdened societies and outlaws. It is also precisely this feature that distinguishes decent societies from benevolent absolutisms and could explain why Rawls thinks the peace thesis can reasonably be extended to one and not the 
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8 Audard (2006: 66) agrees that if such peace is a feature of only democratic peoples then Rawls should also sanction democratising interventions into decent but non-liberal peoples. The response to Moellendorf outlined here is also, in part, a response to this concern.
9 For a very clear summary of many such objections see Catherine (2007) chapter 5.
